\ am- 


Pamphlet  No.  28 
Series  of  1923-24 
June,  1924 


TEXT 

OF  THE  DRAFT  TREATY 
OF  DISARMAMENT 
AND  SECURITY 


PREPARED  BY  AN  AMERICAN  COMMITTEE 
AND  SUBMITTED  OFFICIALLY  BY  THE 
COUNCIL  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  TO 
THE  GOVERNMENTS  REPRESENTED  BY  IT 


WITH  A COMMENTARY  PREPARED 
IN  CONSULTATION  WITH 

Dr.  James  T.  Shotwell 

for  the 

Foreign  Policy  Association 

NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS 

NINE  EAST  FORTY-FIFTH  STREET 
NEW  YORK 


r~r^HE  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  at  its  June  meeting  took 
t action  of  an  unprecedented  nature  in  deciding  unanimously  to 
submit  as  an  official  document  of  the  League  a report  on  the 
limitation  of  armaments  prepared  by  an  American  Committee  of 
private  citizens.  The  action  of  the  Council  was  doubtless  partly  due 
to  the  list  of  distinguished  Americans  who  have  cooperated  in  the 
preparation  of  the  document.  The  group  consists  of  Dr.  James  T. 
Shotwell,  professor  of  History  at  Columbia  University,  a member 
of  the  American  delegation  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  and  a com- 
missioner of  the  Labor  Section  of  the  Treaty;  General  Tasker  H. 
Bliss,  American  representative  on  the  Supreme  War  Council;  Dr. 
Isaiah  Bowman,  executive  head  of  the  technical  experts  of  the 
American  delegation  at  the  Paris  Peace  Conference;  Dr.  Joseph  P. 
Chamberlain,  professor  of  Public  Law  at  Columbia  University ; 
Professor  John  Bates  Clark,  former  Director  of  the  Division  of 
Economics  and  History  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for  International 
Peace;  Dr.  Stephen  P.  Duggan,  Director  of  the  Institute  for  Inter- 
national Education  of  the  Carnegie  Foundation;  General  James  G. 
Harbord,  former  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  American  Army;  Frederick 
P.  Keppel,  former  Assistant  Secretary  of  War;  David  Hunter 
Miller,  legal  adviser  to  the  United  States  Government  at  the  Paris 
Peace  Conference;  and  Dr.  Henry  S.  Pritchett,  President  of  the 
Carnegie  Foundation. 

A personal  link  between  this  group  and  influential  personages  in 
Europe  was  furnished  by  the  fact  that  Dr.  Shotwell  had  discussed  the 
problems  in  question  with  responsible  European  statesmen,  cabinet 
members,  military  and  naval  experts  and  other  important  personages 
in  France,  England,  Belgium,  Italy,  Germany,  Austria,  Hungary  and 
Czechoslovakia.  The  American  group  was  entirely  unofficial. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  question  of  disarmament  with  which 
this  Treaty  deals  will  come  up  before  the  Assembly  of  the  League 
this  year  in  September,  it  is  very  important  that  the  discussion  should 
take  concrete  form  as  soon  as  possible  and  the  results  communicated 
to  the  Committee  which  prepared  the  Treaty,  or  to  the  Foreign  Policy 
Association.  ' 

The  proposed  treaty  has  already  aroused  unusual  interest  both  in 
this  country  and  Europe,  and  is  distributed  by  the  Foreign  Policy 
Association  in  the  hope  of  bringing  forth  wide  and  constructive  dis- 
cussion. 


The  Commentary  appears  on  page  8. 


Draft  Treaty 
of 

Disarmament  and  Security 


The  high  contracting  parties,  being  desirous  of 

promoting  peace  and  of  lessening  the  danger  of  war  by  reduction 
and  limitation  of  armaments,  agree  to  this  treaty. 

PART  I. 

GENERAL  MEASURES 
CHAPTER  1. 

Outlawry  of  Aggressive  War 

Article  1. — The  High  Contracting  Parties  solemnly  declare  that  ag- 
gressive war  is  an  international  crime.  They  severally  undertake  not 
to  be  guilty  of  its  commission. 

Article  2. — A State  engaging  in  war  for  other  than  purposes  of 
defense  commits  the  international  crime  described  in  Article  1. 

Article  3. — The  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  shall  have 
jurisdiction,  on  the  complaint  of  any  signatory,  to  make  a judgment 
to  the  effect  that  the  international  crime  described  in  Article  1 has 
or  has  not  in  any  given  case  been  committed. 

CHAPTER  II. 

Acts  of  Aggression 

Article  4. — The  High  Contracting  Parties  solemnly  declare  that  acts 
of  aggression,  even  wheri  not  resulting  in  war,  and  preparations  for 
such  acts  of  aggression,  are  hereafter  to  be  deemed  forbidden  by 
international  law. 

Article  5. — In  the  absence  of  a state  of  war,  measures  of  force  by 
land,  by  sea  or  in  the  air  taken  by  one  State  against  another  and  not 
taken  for  purposes  of  defense  or  for  the  protection  of  human  life 
shall  be  deemed  to  be  acts  of  aggression. 

Any  signatory  which  claims  that  another  signatory  has  violated  any 
of  the  terms  of  this  treaty  shall  submit  its  case  to  the  Permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice. 

A signatory  refusing  to  accept  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  in  any 
such  case  shall  be  deemed  an  aggressor  within  the  terms  of  this 
treaty. 

Failure  to  accept  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  within  four  days 
after  submission  of  a claim  of  violation  of  this  treaty  shall  be  deemed 
a refusal  to  accept  the  jurisdiction. 

Article  6. — The  Court  shall  also  have  jurisdiction  on  the  complaint 

3 


of  any  signatory  to  make  a judgment  to  the  effect  that  there  has  or 
has  not  in  any  given  case  been  committed  a violation  of  international 
law  within  the  terms  of  Article  4. 

Article  7. — The  Permanent  Advisory  Conference  hereinafter  men- 
tioned shall  from  time  to  time  consider  the  further  codifying  of  the 
principles  of  international  law  relating  to  acts  of  aggression  and 
preparations  for  such  acts. 

In  this  regard,  the  conference  shall  take  into  account  the  additional 
security  to  the  signatories  and  the  progressive  disarmament  which 
are  by  this  treaty  contemplated. 

The  recommendations  of  the  conference  shall  be  submitted  to  the 
High  Contracting  Parties  for  their  adoption,  and  shall  also  be  trans- 
mitted to  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice. 

CHAPTER  HI. 

Sanctions 

Article  8. — In  the  event  of  any  H.  C.  P.*  having  been  adjudged  an 
aggressor  pursuant  to  this  treaty,  all  commercial,  trade,  financial  and 
property  interests  of  the  aggressor  and  of  its  nationals  shall  cease  to 
be  entitled,  either  in  the  territories  of  the  other  signatories  or  on  the 
high  seas,  to  any  privileges,  protection,  rights  or  immunities  accorded 
by  either  international  law,  national  law  or  treaty. 

Any  H.  C.  P.  may  in  such  case  take  such  other  steps  toward  the 
severance  of  trade,  financial,  commercial  and  personal  intercourse 
with  the  aggressor  and  its  nationals  as  it  may  deem  proper  and  the 
H.  C.  P.  may  also  consult  together  in  this  regard. 

The  period  during  which  any  such  economic  sanction  may  be  con- 
tinued shall  be  fixed  at  any  time  by  the  Court  at  the  request  of  any 
signatory. 

In  the  matter  of  measures  of  force  to  be  taken,  each  signatory  shall 
consult  its  own  interests  and  obligations. 

Article  9. — If  any  H.  C.  P.  shall  be  adjudged  an  aggressor  by  the 
Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice,  such  power  shall  be  liable 
for  all  costs  to  all  other  H.  C.  P.  resulting  from  its  aggression. 

CHAPTER  IV. 

Decrees  of  the  Permanent  Court 

Article  10. — The  H.  C.  P.  agree  to  accept  the  judgment  of  the 
Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  as  to  the  fulfillment  or  viola- 
tion of  the  contracts  of  this  treaty. 

Any  question  arising  under  this  treaty  is  ipso  facto  within  the 
compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  Court. 

Article  11. — If  a dispute  arising  under  this  treaty  shall  be  submitted 
to  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice,  it  is  for  the  Court 
to  decide  as  to  its  jurisdiction  and  also  whether  or  not  its  decree  has 
been  complied  with. 


• High  Contracting  Party  or  Parties. 


4 


PART  II. 

DISARMAMENT 
CHAPTER  I. 

Reduction  and  Limitation  of  Armament 

Article  12. — The  H.  C.  P.*  recognizing  that  excessive  armaments 
constitute  a menace  of  war  mutually  agree: 

(i)  To  limit  or  reduce  their  armaments  to  the  basis  necessary  for 
the  maintenance  of  peace  and  national  security. 

(ii)  To  study  the  ways  and  means  for  future  reduction  of  arma- 
ments either  as  between  all  signatories  or  as  between  any  two  of  them. 

' CHAPTER  H. 

Demilitarized  Zones 

Article  13. — In  order  to  facilitate  the  security  and  progressive  dis- 
armament contemplated  by  the  present  treaty,  any  H.  C.  P.  may 
agree  with  one  or  more  neighboring  countries  for  the  establishment 
of  demilitarized  zones. 

CHAPTER  HI. 

Permanent  Advisory  Conference 

Article  14. — The  H.  C.  P.  will  call  a permanent  advisory  conference 
upon  disarmament  which  shall  meet  not  less  than  once  every  three 
years. 

This  conference  shall,  in  addition  to  its  functions  as  described  in 
Article  7,  publish  periodical  reports  concerning  the  actual  conditions 
of  the  armaments  of  the  signatory  States. 

The  conference  shall  advise  the  H.  C.  P.  concerning  measures  to 
be  taken  to  insure  the  carrying  out  of  the  principles  of  the  present 
treaty  and  it  may  prepare  supplementary  treaties  for  the  establishment 
of  demilitarized  zones  and  for  the  further  promotion  of  disarmament 
and  peace. 

Article  15. — The  Advisory  Conference  upon  disarmament  shall 
appoint  a Permanent  Technical  Committee. 

Article  16. — The  Permanent  Advisory  Conference  or  its  Permanent 
Technical  Committee  shall  give  advice  on  technical  questions  to  the 
Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  at  the  request  of  said  Court. 

Article  17. — The  expenses  of  the  Permanent  Advisory  Conference 
and  of  its  agencies  shall  be  borne  by  the  signatory  powers  in  the  pro- 
portions of  their  respective  budgets  for  defense. 

PART  m. 

INTERNATIONAL  INFORMATION 
CHAPTER  I. 

Commission  of  Inquiry 

Article  18. — By  the  terms  of  Article  8 of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations: 

“The  members  of  the  League  undertake  to  interchange  full  and 
frank  information  as  to  the  scale  of  their  armaments,  their  military. 


• High  Contracting  Party  or  Parties. 


6 


naval  and  air  programs  and  the  condition  of  such  of  their  industries 
as  are  adaptable  to  warlike  purposes.” 

In  order  to  facilitate  the  carrying  out  of  the  said  engagement  by 
the  powers  party  thereto,  the  signatories  hereto  agree  that  there  shall 
be  maintained  under  the  direction  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of 
Nations  a commission  charged  with  the  duty  of  making  the  necessary 
official  examinations  and  reports. 

Article  19. — The  said  commission  shall  proceed  under  such  regula- 
tions as  the  Council  of  the  League  shall  from  time  to  time  approve. 

Article  20. — Subject  to  such  regulations  the  members  of  the  com- 
mission shall  be  entitled,  when  they  deem  it  desirable,  to  proceed  to 
any  point  within  the  territory  of  any  signatory  or  to  send  sub-com- 
missions or  to  authorize  one  or  more  of  their  members  go  to  proceed  on 
behalf  of  the  commission. 

Article  21. — The  signatories  hereto  will  give  all  necessary  facilities 
to  the  said  commission  in  the  performance  of  its  duties. 

Article  22. — All  reports  made  to  the  Council  of  the  League  by  the 
said  commission  shall  be  communicated  to  the  signatory  powers. 

CHAPTER  11. 

Opinions  of  the  Council 

Article  23. — The  Council  of  the  League,  taking  into  account  the 
reports  and  opinions  of  the  said  commission,  shall  at  any  time  when 
requested  by  any  signatory  hereto,  consider  summarily  whether  (a) 
the  armaments  of  any  signatory  to  this  treaty  are  in  excess  of  those 
fixed  under  its  provisions;  or  (b)  the  military  or  other  preparations 
of  any  State  are  of  such  a nature  as  to  cause  apprehension  of  aggres- 
sion or  an  eventual  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

Article  24. — If  the  Council  shall  upon  such  request  be  of  the  opinion 
that  there  is  reasonable  ground  for  thinking  that  a menace  of  aggres- 
sion has  arisen,  the  parties  to  the  defensive  agreements  hereinafter 
mentioned  may  put  into  immediate  execution  the  plan  of  assistance 
which  they  have  agreed  upon. 

Article  25. — If  the  Council  shall,  upon  such  request,  not  be  of 
opinion  that  a menace  of  aggression  has  arisen,  a public  report 
to  the  effect  shall  be  made  and  in  such  case  no  signatory  shall  be 
under  any  obligation  to  put  into  execution  any  plan  of  assistance 
to  which  it  is  a party;  but  any  signatory,  believing  itself  to  be  threat- 
ened with  a menace  of  aggression,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the 
Council  of  the  League  has  not  been  of  such  opinion,  may  forthwith 
notify  the  Council  to  that  effect,  and  such  signatory  shall  thereupon 
have  full  liberty  of  action  in  military  or  other  preparations  for  de- 
fense, subject,  however,  to  the  limitations  as  to  armament  which  are 
imposed  by  any  treaty  then  in  force  other  than  this  treaty  and  treaties 
dependent  thereon. 

PART  IV. 

TREATIES  OF  MUTUAL  ASSISTANCE 

Article  26. — The  H.  C.  P.*  may  conclude,  either  as  between  two 
of  them  or  as  between  a larger  number,  agreements  complementary 


• High  Contracting  Party  or  Parties. 


6 


to  the  present  treaty,  exclusively  for  the  purpose  of  their  mutual 
defense  and  intended  solely  to  facilitate  the  carrying  out  of  the  mea- 
sures prescribed  in  this  treaty,  determining  in  advance  the  assistance 
which  they  would  give  to  each  other  in  the  event  of  any  act  of 
aggression. 

Such  agreements  may,  if  the  H.  C.  P.*  interested  so  desire,  be 
negotiated  and  concluded  under  the  auspices  of  the  League  of 
Nations. 

Article  27. — Complementary  agreements,  as  defined  in  the  preced- 
ing article,  shall,  before  being  registered,  be  examined  by  the  Council 
with  a view  to  deciding  whether  they  are  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  of  this  treaty  and  of  the  Covenant. 

In  particular,  the  Council  shall  consider  if  the  cases  of  aggression 
contemplated  in  these  agreements  are  of  a nature  to  give  rise  to  an 
obligation  to  give  assistance  on  the  part  of  the  other  H.  C.  P. 

The  Council  may,  if  necessary,  suggest  changes  in  the  texts  of 
the  agreements  submitted  to  it. 

When  recognized,  the  agreements  shall  be  registered  in  conformity 
with  Article  18  of  the  Covenant.  They  shall  be  regarded  as  comple- 
mentary to  the  present  treaty,  and  shall  in  no  way  limit  the  general 
obligations  of  the  H.  C.  P.  nor  the  sanctions  contemplated  against 
an  aggressor  under  the  terms  of  this  treaty. 

They  will  be  open  to  any  other  H.  C.  P.  with  the  consent  of  the 
signatory  States. 

Article  28. — In  all  cases  of  aggression,  for  which  provision  is  made 
in  the  agreement  constituting  a defensive  group,  the  H.  C.  P.  which 
are  members  of  such  group  may  undertake  to  put  into  operation 
automatically  the  plan  of  assistance  agreed  upon  between  them ; and 
in  all  other  cases  of  aggression,  or  menace  or  danger  of  aggression, 
directly  aimed  at  them,  they  will  consult  each  other  before  taking 
action,  and  will  inform  the  Council  of  the  measures  which  they  are 
contemplating. 

PART  V. 

PARTIES  TO  THE  TREATY 
CHAPTER  I. 

Accession 

Article  29. — Any  State,  member  or  not  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
may  adhere  to  this  treaty  by  depositing  an  act  of  adhesion  with  the 
Secretary  General  of  the  League,  who  shall  at  once  inform  the  other 
signatories  thereof. 

CHAPTER  H. 

Withdrawal 

Article  30. — Any  party  to  this  Treaty  may  withdraw  therefrom  by 
depositing  an  act  of  withdrawal  with  the  Secretary  General  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  Such  withdrawal  shall  take  effect  one  year  after 
the  deposit  thereof  and  only  as  to  the  Party  withdrawing. 


• High  Contracting  Party  or  Parties. 


7 


CHAPTER  III. 

Ratification 

Article  31. — The  present  Treaty  shall  be  ratified  and  the  instruments 
of  ratification  shall  be  deposited  as  soon  as  possible  with  the  Secretary 
General  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

It  shall  come  into  force : 

In  Europe  when  it  shall  have  been  ratified  by  five  European  States, 
including  France,  Great  Britain  and  Italy. 

In  Asia  when  it  shall  have  been  ratified  by  two  Asiatic  States,  one 
of  which  shall  be  Japan. 

In  North  America  when  ratified  by  the  United  States  of  America. 

In  Central  America  and  the  West  Indies  when  ratified  by  one  State 
in  the  West  Indies  and  two  in  Central  America. 

In  South  America  when  ratified  by  four  States  in  South  America, 
one  of  which  shall  be  either  Argentina,  Brazil  or  Chile. 

In  Africa  and  Oceania  when  ratified  by  two  States  in  Africa  and 
Oceania. 

With  regard  to  the  H.  C.  P.  which  may  subsequently  ratify  the 
Treaty,  it  will  come  into  force  at  the  date  of  the  deposit  of  the  instru- 
ment of  ratification. 

COMMENTARY  ON  THE  TREATY 

T T was  at  once  evident  to  the  Committee  that  the  starting  point  for 
the  discussion  of  the  problem  in  America  was  fundamentally  dif- 
ferent from  the  basis  of  European  discussion.  In  the  United  States  the 
main  interest  lies  in  policies  of  disarmament  smd  the  ‘‘outlawry  of 
wap’;  in  Europe,  especially  on  the  Continent,  and  more  especially  in 
these  post-war  years,  the  problem  of  national  security  takes  pre- 
cedence. 

The  task  of  the  American  committee  was  to  harmonize  these  two 
divergent  points  of  view  and,  ultimately,  a draft  Treaty  was  drawn  up. 
The  Treaty  which  the  Council  is  now  circulating  to  the  fifty-four 
governments  of  the  League  of  Nations  oflFers  for  the  first  time  in 
the  history  of  international  law,  a comprehensive  definition  of  ag- 
gression, and  at  the  same  time,  outlaws  the  aggressor. 

The  definition  of  aggression  is  a negative  one.  Any  state  refusing 
summons  by  another  state  before  the  Permanent  Court  of  Int^- 
national  Justice  on  a charge  of  aggression,  thereby  admits  its  guQt. 
Some  reply  must  be  made  within  four  days  or  the  other  Powers  are 
free  automatically  to  apply  the  measure  of  enforcement  indicated 
in  the  Treaty.  The  four-day  time  limit  is  inserted  to  prevent  an 
aggressor  from  continuing  war-like  preparations  while  trifling  with 
an  appeal  to  the  Court.  It  safeguards  the  security  of  the  complainant’s 
power. 

The  Court  is  not  called  upon  to  decide  political  and  non-justiciable 

8 


issues  as  to  matters  of  policy.  It  has  to  find  whether  or  not  certain 
overt  acts  have  been  committed  and  whether  they  violate  this  con- 
tract. In  order  to  define  this  class  of  acts  a world  conference  is  to 
assemble  frequently  and  its  experts  are  to  form  a permanent  com- 
mission. 

Again,  the  problem  of  enforcement  has  been  met  by  an  entirely 
new  method  which  does  not  involve  the  government  of  any  country 
further  than  its  own  interests  dictate,  and  yet,  it  secures  an  adequate 
pressure  upon  the  aggressor  by  threatening  the  safety  of  its  business 
interests. 

There  b no  surrender  of  national  sovereignty. 

No  troops  are  to  be  sent  abroad  on  punitive  expeditions  or  for  any 
other  purpose,  at  the  behest  of  any  Council  of  the  League  or  other 
outside  Power.  The  method  of  enforcement  lies  entirely  in  the 
economic  field. 

In  the  economic  sanction,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  do  not 
bind  themselves  by  this  Treaty  to  do  anything  contrary  to  their  own 
interests.  But  they  are  free  to  do  all  manner  of  things  as  against 
an  aggressor  with  reference  to  its  property  rights  on  the  high  seas 
or  within  their  own  frontiers.  In  a word,  the  aggressor  b outlawed, 
and,  as  such,  deprived  of  any  security  for  his  property  in  other  lands. 
Automatically  he  loses  his  own  security  throughout  the  whole  world. 

The  effect  of  thb  outlawry  upon  business  interests  would  be  in- 
stant. No  trader  could  be  sure  that  his  ships  would  receive  entry  into 
the  ports  of  another  Signatory  or  that  his  investments  in  their  keeping 
would  not  be  immediately  attached.  In  a world  built  upon  a basis  of 
credit,  the  result  would  be  for  the  aggressor  unavoidable  panic,  of 
greater  or  less  degree.  The  effect  of  this  would  at  once  be  registered  in 
the  fall  in  exchange  value  of  the  currency  of  the  aggressor  state. 

It  should  be  remembered  that  this  is  not  the  full  extent  of  the 
economic  sanction  for  the  aggressor  state.  Sooner  or  later  it  will  have 
to  pay  the  whole  costs  of  reparations  and  of  war  expenses  to  both  the 
victims  of  its  aggression,  and  those  Powers,  even  neutral,  which  have 
suffered  by  the  economic  displacement  of  the  act  of  aggression.  It 
will  thus  be  seen  that  the  enforcement  of  the  Treaty  brings  into  play 
the  two  experiences  of  Europe  which  have  registered  most  keenly  in 
the  mind  of  the  common  people  as  well  as  governments  the  disastrous 
effects  of  war,  namely  in  the  fall  of  exchange  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
infliction  of  reparation  penalties  upon  the  other.  The  whole  economic 
lesson  of  the  World  War,  the  lesson  burned  into  the  consciousness 
and  conscience  of  Europe  as  nothing  else  has  ever  been,  is  thus  brought 
to  bear  upon  the  prevention  of  war  and  the  preparations  for  war  in 
the  future. 


9 


With  reference  to  the  adherence  of  the  United  States  to  this  Treaty, 
it  is  evident  that  some  verbal  changes  are  necessary  so  long  as  the 
United  States  is  not  a member  of  the  League  of  Nations,  since  this 
Treaty  has  been  drawn  up  for  those  states  which  are  within  the  League, 
But  the  general  principles  embodied  in  the  Treaty  should  not  meet 
with  technical  objections  upon  the  part  of  the  United  States 
and  the  verbal  changes  can  be  easily  made  by  simply  eliminating  the 
United  States  from  those  Articles  of  the  Treaty  which  mention  the 
Council  or  the  League,  or  by  accepting  the  position  of  a mere  associate. 
There  could  be  no  harm,  for  instance,  in  accepting  the  Secretariat  of  the 
League  as  the  body  which  should  register  treaties.  Its  usefulness  as 
an  agent  of  public  diplomacy  is  already  demonstrated  and  involves  no 
entanglements.  Over  five  hundred  treaties  have  been  registered  in 
the  five  years  of  the  League’s  existence,  some  with  Powers  outside 
the  League.  It  is  simply  a formality  for  securing  publicity  and  is 
the  only  international  device  of  the  kind  that  has  yet  been  tried.  Since 
treaties  involving  the  United  States  are  discussed  in  the  Senate,  how- 
ever, even  this  item  need  not  be  maintained  in  the  American  edition 
of  the  Treaty;  but  it  would  be  inconceivable  that  the  trivial  difficulties 
of  making  slight  verbal  changes  should  ever  stand  in  the  way  of  favor- 
able action  by  the  United  States  upon  the  question  as  a whole.  This 
Treaty  not  only  embodies  ideals  of  those  most  anxious  that  America 
should  play  its  part  in  the  peaceful  settlement  of  international  disputes, 
but  it  also  carefully  avoids  all  those  elements  of  the  League  of  Nations 
as  outlined  in  the  Covenant  which  have  met  with  most  opposition  in 
the  United  States. 

In  short,  this  Treaty  leaves  the  United  States,  like  all  other 
Signatory  Powers,  completely  free  to  decide  whether  and  to  what 
extent  it  will  participate  in  any  given  case. 

The  treaty  is  just  as  applicable  to  Germany  and  Russia  as  it  is  to 
the  United  States,  in  that  Powers  can  sign  it  who  are  not  members 
of  the  League.  The  members  of  the  League  would  simply  use  more 
of  the  machinery  of  the  League  than  the  non-members,  in  that  they 
would  have  as  well  a means  for  straightening  out  political  contro- 
versies and  provocative  acts  which  lead  to  armament.  This  Treaty 
does  not  include  that  kind  of  action  at  all.  It  deals  only  with  the 
question  of  armament. 

Neither  is  it  a general  Treaty  of  compulsory  arbitration.  The 
question  to  come  before  the  Court  is  not  political,  but  whether  or 
not  one  of  the  parties  to  a contract  has  broken  it.  The  Permanent 

Advisory  Conference  and  not  the  Court  will  consider  the  formulation 
of  the  conditions  to  be  observed  in  applying  the  Treaty. 

10 


The  Treaty  is  not  modelled  after  the  Washington  treaties,  in  which 
the  limitation  of  armament  was  based  upon  a set  ratio  between  different 
countries.  Experts,  especially  in  chemical  warfare,  point  out  that  such 
ratios  can  not  be  either  ascertained  or  applied  at  present.  Therefore, 
the  Treaty  calls  into  existence  an  Intemational  advisory  conference 
on  disarmament  which  b to  meet  periodically  at  least  once  every 
three  years,  to  keep  pace  with  the  progress  of  invention  and  dis- 
covery. This  conference  is  to  be  supplied  with  a technical  investi- 
gating committee  responsible  to  the  conference.  The  necessity  of 
having  a conference  on  disarmament  is  recognized  on  all  hands.  But 
what  is  needed  is  something  more;  the  conference  must  be  periodic. 
The  experience  of  the  Washington  Conference  shows  that  if  a con- 
ference makes  no  provision  for  its  own  re-assembling,  the  subsequent 
recrimination  between  the  interested  parties  may  tend  to  make  matters 
worse  instead  of  better.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a conference  recurs 
automatically,  the  questions  in  dispute  can  be  brought  up  without 
involving  the  national  honor  of  miy  of  the  parties  to  it. 

In  providing  a commission  to  facilitate  the  interchange  of  full 
and  frank  information  as  to  the  scale  of  the  armaments,  the  military, 
naval  and  air  programs,  etc.,  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  the 
Treaty  embodies  not  only  a provision  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League 
of  Nations  but  a device  which  at  the  Peace  Conference  at  Paris  was 
strongly  urged  by  Marshal  Foch  in  the  interests  of  the  pacification 
of  Europe.  The  commission  charged  with  the  duty  of  investigating 
how  the  various  High  Contracting  Parties  were  carrying  out  the 
terms  of  this  Treaty  could  hardly  be  objected  to  by  a Power  which 
entered  into  it  in  good  faith.  In  any  case,  it  is  the  opinion  of  highly 
qualified  military  experts  in  the  United  States  that  this  country  would 
have  no  objection  to  the  adoption  of  the  plan  so  earnestly  advocated 
by  Marshal  Foch  at  the  Peace  Conference. 

The  relation  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  the  new 
machinery  which  it  is  proposed  to  set  up  should  be  clearly  understood. 
The  Council  is  to  receive  the  reports  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry 
and  express  its  opinions  concerning  them.  But  it  can  not  call  out  a 
League  army  to  enforce  peace.  The  Treaty  not  only  makes  no  pro- 
vision for  such  action;  its  whole  tenor  is  in  another  direction.  And 
there  is  no  provision  whatever  for  any  such  army.  According  to 
the  Treaty,  the  Council  would  tend  to  become  more  and  more  an  in- 
strument of  conciliation  and  its  administrative  functions  in  this  regard 
would  become  inoperative.  There  is  no  superstate  left  in  the  struc- 
ture of  this  Treaty.  On  the  other  hand,  the  sphere  of  operation  of 
the  Council  is  a large  and  important  one.  Its  function!  in  the  political 


11 


sphere  is  left  untouched.  It  can  still  serve  to  lessen  the  dangers 
arising  from  provocative  political  policies.  This  Treaty  does  not 
touch  upon  any  of  those  topics.  Consequently  the  sphere  of  action 
of  the  Council  does  not  fully  appear.  The  Treaty  deals  only  with 
security  and  disarmament.  It  is  an  attempt  to  reduce  this  dual  prob- 
lem to  the  dimensions  of  a contract  dealing  with  strictly  technical 
matters.  The  Council  of  the  League  is  not  called  upon  to  act  outside 
its  legitimate  sphere  in  the  enforcement  of  the  Treaty  or  in  its  ad- 
ministration. Instead  of  regarding  this  limitation  of  its  functions 
as  lessening  its  validity,  however,  it  in  reality  strengthens  its  position 
in  the  sphere  in  which  it  is  necessary  and  legitimate.  For  nothing 
could  injure  an  institution  more  than  to  clothe  it  with  large  theoretic 
powers  which  can  not  be  applied  in  the  hour  of  need  or  which  may  be 
defied  by  a recalcitrant  government. 

Finally,  the  Treaty  makes  provision  for  including  other  treaties 
between  two  or  more  Powers  either  as  ententes  or  alliances,  when 
they  are  designed  solely  for  defensive  purposes,  enabling  the  parties 
to  them  to  lessen  their  armaments.  A tendency  towards  the  old 
“balance  of  power”  is  perhaps  inherent  in  this  part  of  the  Treaty.  But 
the  Treaty  safeguards  any  trend  in  this  direction  by  placing  a great 
premium  upon  publicity  of  engagements  as  over  against  secret  in- 
trigues. To  avoid  the  danger  of  including  treaties  which  were  in 
spirit  contrary  to  the  purpose  of  this  Treaty,  this  remarkable  device  has 
been  inserted  taken  from  the  proposals  of  Colonel  Requin,  French 
military  technical  expert,  in  the  Treaty  of  Mutual  Assistance  prepared 
for  the  League  of  Nations.  All  publicly  announced  treaties  which 
have  been  accepted  by  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  and 
scrutinized  by  it  as  coming  within  the  meaning  of  this  Treaty  and 
of  the  Covenant,  may  be  carried  out  automatically.  There  is  no  need 
of  waiting  to  secure  the  consent  of  the  Council,  Court,  or  any  other 
body  to  carry  out  their  terms.  This  provision  is  of  the  greatest 
possible  importance  in  the  hour  of  danger,  for  “in  all  other  cases,” 
the  Signatories  must  first  “inform  the  Council  of  the  measures  which 
they  are  contemplating,”  and  await  its  action.  This  means  that  where 
there  are  secret  agreements  or  where  acts  of  aggression  arise,  there  is 
inevitable  delay,  for  the  remedy  lies  through  the  machinery  of  the 
League  of  Nations  and  not  by  direct  action. 

No  greater  incentive  for  publicity  of  engagements  could  be  found 
than  this  which  makes  the  security  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  de- 
pendent to  a large  degree  upon  having  announced  their  engagements 
to  the  world  through  registration  with  the  League  of  Nations.  Free- 
dom for  automatic  and  immediate  action  may  easily  be,  in  cases  like 
these,  a matter  of  life  and  death. 


12 


